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TEST PHILOSOPHY AND RESULTANT RECORD* 
bY 
John H. Boeckel, Albert R. Timmins and Kenneth R. Mercy 
Goddard Space  Flight  Center 
GSFC TEST PHILOSOPHY 
Because  spacecraft are not only one-shot but are   a lso one-of-a-kind, statistical  approaches 
to  testing developed for  mass  production of consumer goods and weapons a r e  not  applicable,  Ac- 
tual  flight  hardware  must be exposed  to  the  expected  operating  environment  to  assure a high prob- 
ability of successful performance in space. In addition, several goals must be achieved by the 
spacecraft  test  program: 
1. Verify that designs (system, subsystem, and component) meet performance requirements. 
2. Verify that pavticular  kavdware  samples meet  performance  requirements. 
3 .  Eliminate  defects  in  material and workmanship. 
4. Discover  unexpected  interactions  between  subassemblies,  particularly when the  system is 
exposed  to  environmental  stress. 
5. Verify that ground-support and data processing equipment are compatible with the 
spacecraft. 
6. Train  spacecraft  operations and data  processing  personnel. 
The  various  types of tests used  to  attain  these  goals are identified  and  discussed below. 
Functional Testing 
Systems 
GSFC has  endorsed  the  full-systems  test  approach  in which the  entire  system is tested  under 
conditions which are as realistic as possible.  Systems  tests  generally fall into  one of two categories: 
Functional tests are intended to  establish  that  each  subsystem is doing its designated  job 
*Presented to the March 1969 MSFC Symposium on Long Life Hardware for Space,  Huntsville, Alabama. 
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in conjunction with the other spacecraft subsystems. This testing includes actually calibrating 
any  spacecraft  sensors or  instrumentation and establishing a spacecraft performance baseline 
which  can  be used  for  comparison  throughout  the  environmental test phase. 
Compatibility tests, considered  here  in  their  broadest  sense, are an extension of the  functional 
tests. Compatibility testing includes electromagnetic compatability (EMC) assessments, radio- 
frequency interference (RFI) evaluations, and magnetic moment determinations. Early mating 
of parts may be advisable to determine the mechanical compatibility of the spacecraft with the 
launch  vehicle  and  the  aerodynamic  fairing.  Finally,  the  flight  spacecraft is tested with  the  ground- 
support and data  processing  equipment,  personnel,  and  procedures  that will be used to operate  the 
spacecraft  in  orbit. 
Subsystems 
The full-systems test approach does not eliminate the desirability, nor in some cases the 
necessity, of black-box  and  subsystem  qualification  and  acceptance  testing.  Several  inherent  lim- 
itations of systems  testing  are  best  overcome at the  subsystem or black-box  level.  This  matter 
will  be  treated in some  detail  later. 
Environmental Testing 
These tests determine the ability of components, subsystems, and the entire spacecraft to 
withstand environmental rigors that may be experienced before and during launch, and during 
orbital  operation.  The  tests  may  be conducted at any or  all levels of assembly, but are required 
at the  spacecraft  level.  The  severity  and  duration of the tests  are  related  to  the  purpose of the 
tests as indicated below. At times it is difficult  to  distinguish  between  functional  testing  and  en- 
vironmental  testing,  particularly when a specific  environment, e.g.,  high vacuum, is required  for 
the  performance of a functional  test. 
Flight  Acceptance  Testing 
All  flight  hardware is ground-tested  in  the  expected  flight  environment.  The  hardware is ex- 
posed  to  simulated  loading  conditions  produced by temperature,  pressure  (vacuum), and  vibration 
during  the  launch  and  the  orbital  phases of the flight.  Functional tests  appropriate to  the  condi- 
tions  simulated a r e  conducted. Test  levels are chosen  such that, in  theory,  there is one  chance  in 
twenty of their being  exceeded  in  flight. 
Qualification Testing 
A  prototype  model (i.e., the  actual  flight  configuration) is exposed  to  an  environment  intended 
to  produce  loading  conditions  and  stresses  in  excess of those  expected  in  flight.  The  purpose of 
prototype  testing is to insure a margin  in  the  design  to  provide  for  uncertainties  in areas such as 
analyses,  materials, and workmanship. For qualification, test   levels  are chosen  such  that,  again 
in  theory,  there is one  chance  in one hundred of their being  exceeded  in  flight. 
2 
". "".. I .I, I, ..- ., , I 
PYoto-Flight  Testing 
As programs  mature  cases arise of spacecraft  based  primarily on previously flown hardware 
but  somewhat  different  in  design and performance. In these cases a prototype  spacecraft  may  not 
be  required.  Flight  acceptance  and  qualification  testing are combined  and performed on the  flight 
spacecraft.  The  amount of qualification  testing  required is made  consistent  with  the  magnitude of 
the  hardware changes. 
While the  establishment of test levels is defined  above in terms of overall risk, the paucity of 
applicable  data  makes this task one  which does  not  yield  exact  numerical  values. 
GSFC TEST PRACTICE 
In its application of the  test philosophy discussed  above, GSFC recognizes  that there a r e  dif- 
ferences between  in-house  projects  and  those  conducted  entirely by contract. Both follow the same 
philosophical  approach, but the  amount of formal  testing below the  system  level is significantly 
higher  for  contractor-conducted  projects.  The  major  considerations in test planning  will  be dis- 
cussed  separately  for  the two cases. 
In-House Projects 
GSFC has placed heavy reliance on testing at the  system  level.  There  are  several  consequences 
of this  approach. One hope is, of course,  to  reduce  the  total  amount of testing and its associated 
cost. On the  other hand, the risk of entering  the  systems  test  level with a significant  design flaw 
is increased.  Program  delay  for a f i x  at this stage is costly, but may or may  not  be more  costly 
than a complete  subsystem test program.  The  key  element  in  maintaining  cost-effectiveness is 
test  planning  and some knowledge of hardware quality. 
Testing  implies  discovering  whether  something  performs as intended.  Environmental  testing 
requires  the  kinds of s t r e s s  to  which the  device  may  be  expected  to be exposed in  use.  The  em- 
phasis  here is on investigating  the fzmctional performance of the  hardware when exposed to the 
s t r e s s  of the envivonment. It is clear  therefore that systems  test planning  must begin by assuring 
that all the  intended  functions of the  system are to be checked. With a general  outline of functional 
testing  established, one may proceed to a consideration of the manner in which environmental 
s t resses  are  to  be applied. Functional checkout and the application of realistic environmental 
s t ress   may not be compatible  in a systems  test.  For  example,  stimulation of a star tracker with 
a collimator  interferes with  the  tracker's  view of cold  space. A s  each of these  situations arises, 
the  implications  must be carefully  considered. In most  cases, it is found that a subsystems  test 
can be run which makes up for the deficiency  in  the  systems  test. 
There  are  other  situations which suggest  the  desirability of subsystems  testing  to  supplement 
the systems test. For example: 
1. Systems tests seldom  run long enough to  detect  wear-out  problems.  Wherever a fatigue or 
wear-out  potential  exists  (chiefly  in  electromechanical  devices),  the life characteristics 
3 
should  be  investigated on a component or subassembly  basis.  Great  care  must  be  taken 
to  assure  that  the  sample is truly  representative of the  flight  hardware. 
2. After a spacecraft is completely  assembled,  devices  may no longer  be  realistically  oper- 
able  during  systems  testing.  This  occurs  in  some cases because  the  spacecraft  cannot  be 
operated in all possible  orbital  modes on the ground. 
3 .  If only systems tests are run, marginal  conditions  existing at critical  subsystem or black- 
box interfaces  may  remain  undetected. Only testing of the  input/output characteristics of 
the  individual  black  boxes  can  establish  the  presence of adequate  margins. 
In systems  testing,  the  launch  environment  and  the  temperature  and  vacuum  aspects of the 
space  environment  are  emphasized.  The  effects of space  plasma,  magnetic  fields,  and  energetic 
particles  must also be  considered. In many  cases,  however,  facilities  do  not  exist  to  permit 
realistic  exposure of the  complete  system to these  stresses.  Subsystem tests might  seem  appro- 
priate, but for  these  environmental  factors  one  can often  avoid  an  extensive test  program by a con- 
sideration of the  damage  mechanisms  which could be  operative. For example, large classes of 
semiconductor  devices  are  inherently  insensitive  to  energetic  particle  fluxes  at  the  levels encoun- 
tered  in  space.  Testing  these  under  such  conditions would be a waste. On the  other  hand, it is 
important  to know the  expected  degradation of solar  cells  for  the  orbit  in question. This  problem 
can  be  attacked  with a limited  number of samples at the  piece-part  level.  Careful  design  review 
will show that  there  are many similar  situations  in which piece-part  testing  for a particular en- 
vironmental  stress is the  appropriate technique. 
Test planning is begun  with an attempt  to  make  provision  for all practical  functional  tests 
under  environmental stress at the  systems  level. When either a function, or a resistance  to a 
particular  stress cannot be checked at this level, a special  subsystem o r  piece-part  test is devised. 
Out-of-House Projects 
In attempting  to  apply a systems  test philosophy to a project  in which the  spacecraft is supplied 
(and probably  tested) by a prime  contractor, a considerable  degree of flexibility is lost  because 
the  contractual  procedure  requires  definition of the  manner  in which successful  performance  will 
be  judged at a time when it is not  possible  to  establish  in  detail  the  probable  deficiencies of the 
systems  test  program. It is therefore  likely  that a greater depth of subsystem  testing than is used 
for  in-house  programs  will be specified.  Since  most  prime  contractors buy black  boxes  from 
vendors,  they  themselves  face  the  problem of establishing  success  criteria too early  in the program 
to  account  for  those  aspects of performance which will be  thoroughly  checked out later in the 
project. 
In this pyramid of vendors, it is easily  possible  to  reach  extremes  in  providing  assurance. 
All  designs are based on worst-case  analysis  and  mandatory  derating;  piece-parts are purchased 
to  rigorous  specifications;  each  part is screened  and  burned-in;  each  board or I? cdule is func- 
tionally  tested  under  environmental stress; every black box is qualified.  Testing proceeds  until 
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the  complete  system has reached  such a point  that  the only test remaining is the  flight itself. This 
redundant  testing  approach would provide  for a well-ordered  and  comfortable  program,  but GSFC 
makes a conscious  effort  to limit environmental  testing at lower  levels of assembly on out-of- 
house  programs (although  not so drastically as for  in-house  programs).  There  are two basic  rea- 
sons  for  such  limiting:  there is nothing to  be  gained by retesting  the  same  attribute of a device 
repeatedly  (unless  the  cost of a fix at a later stage could be extreme);  there is a large  class of 
problems which  cannot  be found  by testing below the  systems  level  but which will nevertheless 
cause  delays at that point  in  the  program.  The first reason is based on intuitive  judgment  which 
must  be  modified by the  situation at hand. The  second  reason is fully  supported by such  data as 
presented by Smith and Waltz (Reference 1). 
A s  part  of the Test Philosophy  and  Resultant  Record  study a comparison will be made  between 
the results of the two test practice  categories  (in-house  and  out-of-house) at the  flight  spacecraft 
system  test  level,  and at the  space  performance  level. 
SYSTEMS TEST DATA 
A study of the results of using  the GSFC test philosophy has been  made  using a sample of 24 
spacecraft,  fifteen  in-house  projects,  and  nine  out-of-house  projects.  The  systems  test  data on 
flight  spacecraft  have  been  analyzed  for  information  and  guidance  on  the  following  subjects: 
1. Comparison of in-house  and  out-of-house  programs.  The  latter  programs  usually  have 
more complex  and larger  spacecraft,  more  rigid  quality  control  features,  and  more  com- 
prehensive  and  required  testing  before  the  systems  tests  on  the  flight  spacecraft. 
2. Distribution of malfunctions by test  conditions and by spacecraft  subsystems. 
3. Learning curves on multi-spacecraft programs. 
4. Time  required  for an adequate  thermal-vacuum  test of flight-model  spacecraft. 
The  following  definitions are used  for the systems  test  data  presented: 
1. A rnaZfunction is any  performance  outside  the  specified  limits,  either a failure  or  problems. 
2. A problem is any  substandard  performance  or  partial  loss of any  function. 
3. A failure is the  complete  loss of operation of any  function or  subsystem. 
Comparison of In-House and Out-of-House Programs 
Figure 1 shows  the  performance of flight  spacecraft in systems  tests.  The  malfunctions  per 
spacecraft  were 17 and 41 for  the  in-house  and  out-of-house  programs  respectively. In both  pro- 
grams about 40% of the  malfunctions  were  serious enough to  be  classed as failures. No significance 
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should be attached to the relative numbers in 
the two classes of programs  because  there  has 
been no normalizing to account for differing 
complexity between the spacecraft in the two 
classes.  (Neither  weight  nor  the  number of 
piece-parts is considered  suitable  for  normal- 
izing.  For  instance,  the  ratio of average  weights 
for  out-of-house  to  in-house  spacecraft is 7:l. 
Thus, if a comparison  were to  be  based  onprob- 
lems  per pound of spacecraft,  the  relative  stand- 
ing  implied  in  Figure 1 would be reversed.) 
The data does show conclusively that the 
systems  tests  were  needed  for both classes of 
program,  and that despite  rigid quality assur- 
ance  requirements and required  testing  for all 
subsystems,  complex  spacecraft exhibited a 
surprisingly high incidence of malfunctions in 
the  systems  tests. 
The  experiments which a r e  flown a r e  often 
state-of-the-art hardware, and invariably are 
minimized in weight  and size. As such,  they 
might  be  expected  to  be more  vulnerable  to en- 
vironmental  stresses  than  other  parts of a pace- 
craft. Figure 2 shows that approximately 50% 
of the  malfunctions  and  failures  have  been  in  ex- 
perimentsin both classes of programs. In other 
words, systems tests would have been needed 
even if there had been no experiment  hardware. 
Distribution of Malfunctions 
In a separate  study of the  learning  curves 
associated with  multi-launch  programs, all the 
malfunctions in 22 spacecraft were classified 
by t e s t  c o n d i t i o n s  and also by spacecraft 
subsystems. 
By Test Condition 
45 7 
PROBLEMS 
FAILURES 
FAILURES 
Lu 
p. 25 
1 
IN-HOUSE OUT-OF-HOUSE 
PROGRAMS  PROGRAMS 
Figure  1-Performance  of  f l ight  spacecraft 
in systems tests. 
Ll FAILURES 
F EXPER  EXCL 
FAILURES 
PROBLEMS 
*PLUS n 
EXPER  EXPER EXCL 
I N-H OUSE OUT-OF-H  OUsE 
PROGRAMS PROGRAMS 
Figure  2-Performance  of  f l ight  spacecraft 
i n  systems tests. 
All  the  malfunctions  were  categorized  into  one of the following test conditions:  Functional-the 
malfunctions  occurred  during  operation of the system  after it had entered  the  test  phase of the  pro- 
gram; no environmental stress  was applied.  Structural-includes all mechanical  types of tests  such 
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as vibration,  acceleration,  and  deployment.  Space  simulation-includes all thermal and thermal- 
vacuum tests. 
Table 1 shows  the  distribution of 759 malfunctions found during the systems  tests of 22 space- 
craft.  The high incidence of functional  type  malfunctions is indicative of schedule  pressure,  de- 
pendence on the test phase  to  clean up some  operational  details, and the limitations of the  subsystem 
test  program  in  eliminating  problems.  The  small  percentage of structural type malfunctions is a 
tribute  to the design,  fabrication  control,  and  testing for this  part of a spacecraft  program.  The 
space  simulation  test  phase  uncovers a surprising  number of malfunctions  considering the rather 
benign s t resses  involved. The data in  Table 1 indicate  that  this  environment is especially  effective 
with  experiments. If only experiment  malfunctions are considered,  over 50% are  detected  during 
the  space  simulation tests. 
Table 1 
Malfunctions  Observed  During  Systems  Tests of 22 Flight  Spacecraft. 
(Distribution by test  condition) 
Test  Conditions 
Functional 
Structural 
Space simulation 
TOTAL 
Excluding  Experiments 
Number of 
Malfunctions 
210 
50 
115 
375 
% 
56 
13 
31 
100 
Including  Experiments I 
Number of 
Malfunctions 
347 
95 
317 
759 
42 
100 
B y  Spncecvaft Subsystems 
Table 2 shows  the  same  data as Table 1 but the  malfunctions are  distributed by spacecraft  sub- 
system. One distribution  shows  that 51% of the  total  problems  are  attributable to  experiments. 
While this  figure  does show  the  need  for  improvement in performance to  eliminate  problems at the 
flight  system  level, it must  be pointed  out that most  spacecraft have carried 6 to 10 experiments, 
and some  spacecraft have carried 20. When experiments  are  excluded, the other  distribution  in 
Table 2 shows  that 41% of the  problems  were  attributable  to the command and data handling  hardware. 
Learning Curves 
In a program with  five spacecraft  launches,  the  fifth  spacecraft  could  reasonably  be  expected 
to  have  fewer  problems  at  the  systems  test  level than  the first spacecraft.  Five  multilaunch pro- 
grams  were reviewed with the  results shown in  Figure 3. These  programs, involving 22 spacecraft, 
were  also the source of the data in  Tables 1 and 2. Program 2 was  an  in-house  program,  and  shows 
a desirable  learning  curve  for the f i rs t  three spacecraft.  The  fourth  spacecraft,  identified as a proto- 
flight  spacecraft,  was  sufficiently  different  in  design  that it ordinarily would have had a prototype. 
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Table 2 
Malfunctions  Observed  During  Systems  Tests of 22 Flight  Spacecraft. 
(Distribution by spacecraft  subsystem) 
Spacecraft  Subsystem 
- - ~ . .  " "  
Experiments 
Structure 
Thermal 
Power 
Stabilization and control 
Command  and  data  handling 
TOTAL 
" ". " ~ . 
" - . - 
t 
Excluding  Experiments 
Number of 
Malfunctions 
- 
56 
18 
72 
76 
153 
. .. ~- 
375 
Instead, it was a guinea pig, the flight unit be- 
ing tested to prototype levels-hence the name 
protoflight spacecraft. While this could explain 
the. increased number of malfunctions for the 
fourth  spacecraft, no satisfactory explanation 
exists  for  the  poor  performance of the f i f t h  
spacecraft. 
Programs 1, 3 ,  4 and 5, shown in  Figure 3 ,  
were out-of-house programs. Except for pro- 
gram four, no learning curve is in evidence, 
regardless of exclusion of experiments. 
Simulated Space Test Time 
% 
0 
15 
5 
19 
20 
41 
100 
Including  Experiments 
Number of 
Malfunctions 
384 
56 
18 
72 
76 
153 
759 
100 
EXPERIMENT 
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SPACECRAFT 1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3  1734 
PROGRAM 1 2 ' 3  4 5 
. " 
Figure 3-Malfunction learning curves 
on flight spacecraft. 
The  literature is replete with discussions of the  theoretical  failure  pattern bathtub curve  (Fig- 
ure  4) and the  need  to  get  past  the  infant  mortality  region of the  curve  to  minimize  space malfunc- 
tions. Supposedly,  with sufficient  testing  in  the  environmental  test  phase,  the  random  failure  rate 
region of the "bathtub curve"  will  be  reached and space  performance  maximized.  The  problem is: 
What test  period is necessary  in  order to  eliminate  the  infant  mortality  malfunctions? 
A special  study  was  made of the  performance of 11 flight  spacecraft  in  thermal-vacuum  tests. 
(Six of the  spacecraft  were of the  in-house  type and five  were of the  out-of-house type.) If time 
under  vacuum  were  the only controlling  variable  (Figure 5), the data show the  number of failures 
decreasing with time  and  indicate a minimum test period of 16 days  to  reach a plateau.  However, 
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Figure 4-Theoretical failure pattern. Figure  5-Thermal-vacuum  malfunctions of 
eleven  flight spacecraft vs time. 
the  influence of thermal  stress  has not  been  included. When the  same  data were examined  separately 
with regard  to  thermal stresses and time,  (Figure 6) the  total  time  was  about  the  same, but the 
curve had a significantly  different  shape. Note  should be made  that  the  thermal-vacuum test cycles 
fo r  the  eleven  spacecraft  were not uniform,  nor  were  the  days  at  each  thermal  environment  conse- 
cutive. In other  words,  the  data  from  each  spacecraft  test  have  been  segregated  and  arranged  into 
the  form shown in  Figure 6. This  arrangement  postulates  the  cause of failure as time with a ther- 
mal  stress.  These  data  indicate a different  infant  mortality  curve  may  be  associated with each 
different kind of stress.  
The  performance of the  in-house  and  out-of-house  programs is given  in  Figure 7. The  data 
show that  the  time  required for either  class  in  each  thermal  environment is approximately  equal. 
The  minimum  period  required  for  an  adequate  thermal-vacuum test of flight  model  spacecraft is 
approximately 13 days.  The  distribution of time for the  ambient,  transient, hot, and cold  environ- 
ments is 1 day, 4 days, 4 days,  and 4 days  respectively.  Reference 2 emphasizes  that  the  times 
given a r e  minimum and  gives  the  number of spacecraft  for  each  data point. Reference 2 also 
gives a recommended  test  profile for maximizing  test  efficiency  versus  time. 
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Figure  6-Th rmal-vacuum  malfunctions of  eleven tests of  flight spacecraft. 
flight spacecraft vs time and environment. 
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SPACE PERFORMANCE 
Spacecraft  l i fe in Orbit 
The GSFC test  philosophy  can  be  evaluated by analyzing  the  flight  experience  records. Of the 
24 spacecraft  discussed  previously, 23 have  produced  useful  data  in  orbit. One spacecraft  failed 
to  return  information.  Thus,  based on useful  data  received, a success  record of 96% was  achieved 
for  this sample. Table 3 is a comparison of the life of each spacecraft after launch with the 
Table 3 
Spacecraft  Life vs Intended  Life as of January 1969. 
Spacecraft 
Explorer No. I Name 
~~ 
xv 
XVII 
XI1 
XXXVIII 
XXI 
ARIEL I1 
XVIII 
XXXII 
XIV 
ARIEL I 
xxxv 
XXXIV 
XXVIII 
XXVI 
XXXIII 
S-3b 
S-6 
s -3 
RAE -A 
IMP-B 
S-52 
IMP-A 
AE-B 
S-3a 
S-51 
IMP-E 
IMP-F 
IMP-C 
E PE -D 
AIMP-D 
OAO-1 
NIMBUS-1 
OGO-5 
ATS-3 
OGO-4 
OGO -2 
ATS-1 
NIMBUS-2 
OGO-1 
I Days 
Launch  Date  Intended  Life 
Tested  In-House 
10-27-62 
4 -2 -63 
8-15-61 
7-4-68 
10-4-64 
3-27-64 
11-26-63 
5-25-66 
10-2-62 
4-26-62 
7-19-67 
5-24-67 
5-29-65 
12-21-64 
7-1-66 
60 
90 
365 
365 
365 
365 
365 
180 
365 
365 
365 
365 
365 
365 
180 
Tested Out-of-House 
4-8-66 
8-28-64 
3-4-68 
11-5-67 
7-28-67 
10-14-65 
12-6-66 
5-12-66 
9-4-64 
*Spacecraft  continues to operate as of January 1969. 
10 
365 
180 
365 
1095 
365 
365 
1095 
180 
365 
Useful  Life 
95 
100 
112 
180* 
182 
194 
300 
301 
310 
320 
469* 
585* 
702* 
886 
913* 
0 
26 
302* 
421* 
54 1* 
719 
755* 
976 
1578* 
1 Ratio: Usefd to 
I Intended Life 
1.59 
1.11 
.3 1 
- 
.50 
.53 
.82 
1.67 
.85 
.88 
- 
- 
- 
2.43 
- 
0 
.14 
- 
- 
- 
1.97 
- 
5.42 
- 
intended life. The  table is given for  information only,  and is not meant  to  infer  that  the  satisfactory 
completion of a test program is related  to  life  performance.  For this discussion a spacecraft 
success is based on the  scientific  data  obtained,  and  not on attaining  the  intended  life.  Mission 
success  criteria are developed by the  Project and Project  Scientist,  and  approved by NASA Head- 
quarters  prior to  launch. Success or  failure of spacecraft,  vehicle,  and  mission is judged by NASA 
Headquarters.  As  an  example,  the  Explorer XXI spacecraft  was a success,  based on the  scientific 
data obtained,  but  the  mission  and  launch  vehicle  were  classed as failures  because  the  apogee 
achieved  was  about 50,000 miles  rather  than 140,000 miles.  The  successful  spacecraft,  Table 3, 
have life ranges  from 26 to 1500 days with  the  latter still operating as of January 1969. The in- 
tended  lifetime  depends on the  program  requirements.  The  majority of the  spacecraft have  ex- 
ceeded  their  life  requirements with  many maintaining  operational  performance  for  an  additional 
year or  more.  The long lifetimes of OGO spacecraft have  been discussed  in  Reference  4 which 
also  indicates  that  failure  rates due  to  catastrophic 'failure of high population piece  parts are much 
lower  than  predicted. It appears  that  the  parts  selection and control  in  addition  to  various  tests 
conducted at parts and subsystem  level, have  contributed  to  the long lives of these  spacecraft. 
Selection of data  from  Table 3 can  yield  useful  information on spacecraft life in  orbit. Con- 
sidering only  in-house spacecraft with an intended  life of one year,  the  ratio of useful  life  to  in- 
tended life is revealing. For  launches  before  Explorer XXVI (Dec. 1964) the  ratio is 0.65. After 
(and  including) that spacecraft  the  average  ratio is 1.50. In addition,  four of the  five  post-1965 
spacecraft  are still operating,  so  that a ratio of 2.00 is anticipated.  Considering only out-of-house 
spacecraft with an intended  life of one year,  the  ratio is 1.70 for post-1965  launches. Three of 
these  five  spacecraft are   s t i l l  operating; one of the  five  failed  completely  the first day. Omitting 
this  failure,  an  appropriate  estimate of useful  life  for  out-of-house  spacecraft  launched  after 1965 
is 3 years.  (The two spacecraft with  intended  life of 3 years do not  have  sufficient  space  time  for 
any  attempt  to  be  made  to  estimate  useful  life.) 
Test Philosophy vs Orbital Results 
The  bathtub  curve,  depicting  frequency of failure  vs  time  (Reference 3) (Figure 4), has been a 
guide for  establishment of the GSFC test  philosophy. The  curve  suggests  that if a spacecraft is 
completely  assembled  and  checked  out, it experiences many failures  early  in  life  (usually  referred 
to as infant  mortality). GSFC's system  environmental  tests  are  designed  to  locate and correct  the 
failures which  could occur  during  this  period so that  flight  operation  can  be  conducted  under  the 
random  failure  part of the  curve. A comparison of the  failures  per  spacecraft  during  the  test 
phase  to  the  failures  during  the first 30 days of flight  for  spacecraft  tested both in-house  and  out- 
of-house is shown in  Figure 8. The  sharp  decline  in  failures  after  launch  indicate  that infant 
mortality  failures have  been greatly  reduced, but  not eliminated, by the  systems  test. 
A  further  analysis showing the  flight  experiences vs time is presented  in  Figure 9. The 
ordinate  represents  the  failures  per  spacecraft  per 90 days,  and  the  abscissa is 90-day time 
periods after launch. The  failures have been classed as major  and  minor:  major if a severe  de- 
gradation of spacecraft  performance is noted; minor if an experiment is degraded, or if  a 
11 
spacecraft  subsystem is lost but  backed up by redundancy. The two curves-one for  major  failures, 
the  other  for  major  plus minor-show a sharp  drop  in failure rate after the first 90 days. First 
day failures  account  for a large  portion of the  early  failures.  The  data show the infant mortality 
phase still existed  after 90 days,  and  the  random  failure rate was not  reached  until after approxi- 
mately six months  in  orbit.  This  statement  ignores  the  period  from 360 to 450 days,  for which  no 
explanation  has  been found. 
The  plot also indicates  that  wear-out  will not necessarily be related  to any specific  time 
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Figure  8-Spacecraft  failures  test vs f l ight .  
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Figure  9"Major  and  minor  spacecraf t   fa i lures 
vs t ime   i n   f l i gh t .  
period after launch. Although wear-out of some 
spacecraft  subsystems is known to  occur,  the 
failure  mode  does  not  appear  to  increase at any 
particular point  in  the life cycle.  Thus a wear- 
out  period  for  spacecraft  hardware has not  been 
shown in  the  data  accumulated to date. 
Another  analysis of the  space  data  was  made 
to  see if the  intended  life had any  influence on 
the  failure  times. Intended life is synonomous 
with mission  life  requirements, and is preferred 
to  design  life which is usually  longer  than  in- 
tended  life by a factor depending on the  designer. 
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Figure 10"Space fai lures related to intended l i fe. 
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The  same data base as Figure  9 is used, but the flight  time is given as a ratio of the actual  flight 
time  to the intended  flight  time. Both major and  minor  failures are included. The  days  to  each 
failure is divided by the  intended life, and  the  ratio  plotted as shown in  Figure 9A. Only four Of 
the  total 24 spacecraft  were  operating beyond a ratio  (actual  life  to intended life) of two. The 
apparent  increase  in  failures at a ratio of 1.0 to 1.25 is influenced by four failures on  one  space- 
craft, and is not considered  representative.  The  graph  will  also  be  influenced  somewhat as data 
from  the  ten  spacecraft which are still  operating  (Table 3) become  available. With the  reservations, 
as noted, the  interpretation is the same as with Figure 9. That is, a definite  wear-out  period fo r  
spacecraft  hardware has  not been found in data accumulated  to  date. 
Analysis of  the Initial Post Launch Failures 
The  flight  failure  data have  been summarized  in  Table 4. A total of 109  major and minor fa i l -  
ures  for 24 spacecraft  indicate  the following: 
First Day 
Forty-six  percent of the  spacecraft  experienced  first day failures. 
Twenty percent of all failures noted  during  the  life of the  spacecraft  before  January 1969 OC- 
curred  in  the first day. 
Fourteen  percent are   re la ted to experiments and 6% are  related to spacecraft  subsystems. 
Fivst 30 Days 
Sixty-three  percent of the  spacecraft had failures. 
Thirty-five  percent of all failures  occurred  in  the  initial 30-day  flight  period. 
Table 4 
Summary of Spacecraft  Failure Data. 
- ~ _  - 
Number of spacecraft 
Major + minor  flight  failures 
Experiment 
Subsystem 
1st day: 
1-30 day: 
Experiment 
Subsystem 
Number of spacecraft  having  failures  in first 
Xunber  of spacecraft  having  failures on 1st day 
30 days  (Major + minor) 
(Major & minor) 
In-House 
15 
57 
10 
2 
13 
5 
9 (of 15) 
8 (of 15) 
Spacecraft  Tested 
-~ 
1 
Out-of-House 
9 
52 
5 
5 
11 
9 
6 (of 9) 
3 (of 9) 
Total 
24 
109 
15 (14%) 
7 (6%) -22  (20%) 
24 (22%) 
14  (13%) 
15 (63%) 
38 (35%) 
11 (46%) 
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Success Record 
The  operational  performance  for 73 space- 
craft tested in accordance with the GSFC test 
philosophy has been appraised relative to the 
production of useful data and the mission ob- 
jective. Figure 10 shows a plot of the  percent- 
age success for spacecraft vs the launch year. 
Success is here defined as achieving mission 
objectives;  and,  also, is defined as returning 
useful data from the operating spacecraft even 
if  the  injection  prevented  achieving  mission 
objectives.  The  record  has  been  superb  for  the 
initial  ten  years of this new technology. In fact, 
GSFC has been able to maintain 100% success 
for all spacecraft  tested at the  center. 
M 
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Figure 11-Spacecraft f l ight success record 1959- 1968. 
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quirement of all scientific  and  applications f 
spacecraft.  The  success of the GSFC program E 
is measured by the  useful  data  obtained.  Fig- 5 
ure 11 shows a summary of experiment record b 
to  December 1966. The 62% success  repre- 2 
sents fully satisfactory operation of the experi- E 
2 
ment,  and  an  additional 28% of the  xperiments 20 
provided some useful data. In some  cases  use- 
ful  data have  been  obtained when the  vehicle  did 
not meet orbital requirements, and even when 
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the  mission was declared  afailure as in OGO-1. 
The experimenter also obtained useful data in 
some  cases with degraded or  partially  operating 
equipment.  Thus, on an  overall  basis, about 
3% 
FAILURE 
I MENT 1 CRAFT 1 MENT CRAFT 
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TIONED 
90% of the  xperiments have  produced  useful Figure  12-Experiment  record  1959 - 1966. 
data  over  the  seven  year  period. 
1. The need for  systems  level  testing  has been  demonstrated  for both in-house and  out-of- 
house  spacecraft. 
2. Multi-launch programs do  not  eliminate  the  need  for  environmental  testing Of later flight 
systems. 
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3. Spacecraft life has  been  increasing  since 1961, and a useful life in  excess of one  year 
can  be  achieved  with  present GSFC practice on both in-house  and  out-of-house  programs. 
4. The  overall space performance  has  been  satisfactory  for both in-house and out-of-house 
spacecraft. 
5. The test philosophy at Goddard  Space  Flight  Center is applicable  to both in-house and 
out-of-house  programs. 
Goddard Space  Flight  Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Greenbelt, Maryland, September 18, 1969 
326-124-12-03-01 
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